

**Scientific Explanation and Theological Explanation
in the thought of Austin Farrer
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What I want to explore in this paper, in the light of Austin Farrer's work, is the relation between the world as known to the natural and human sciences and the God who made that world and acts within it by providence and grace. I begin by summarising Farrer's understanding of the difference, and the relation, between the approaches of the natural (and human) sciences to the world and the approaches of religion and theology to the world.

Farrer's understanding of the Relation of the natural and human Sciences to the approaches of Religion and Theology

Throughout his writing life, Farrer had a clear picture both of the difference and of the relation between these approaches. In a short piece in the journal *Illuminatio* for 1947, reprinted as the prologue to *Interpretation and Belief*, he observed that 'science obtains precision by artificially limiting its subject matter'.¹ He made the same point in *The Glass of Vision*, published the following year: the information yielded by instruments – physical or conceptual – is real, but selective, relative to the yardsticks we use.²

This point is stressed and developed in the two books with which I am especially concerned in this paper. In *A Science of God?* (its American edition was given the title *God is not Dead*), Farrer stresses again the selectivity of the sciences.³ They use a variety of sieves for selecting those aspects of reality to be studied (in physics, for example, the measurable action of forces on forces). Theology, by contrast, tries to see things in depth and in the round. It does not ignore the results of scientific research, but it concentrates on their relation to God and on what God creatively and providentially brings about in and through them. In *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, Farrer insists that, while science concentrates on the rules and uniformities exemplified by natural forces, theology focuses on the God who makes individuals in and through these natural forces.⁴ But, for Farrer, the hand of God is perfectly hidden. The line between natural tendency and divine direction cannot be seen by us, precisely because, as Farrer puts it in *A Science of God?*, God is not a part of the world, still less an aspect of it.⁵ That is why nothing that is said about God, however truly, can be a statement belonging to any of the sciences.

In *The Glass of Vision*, Farrer acknowledges that the theologian respects the facts disclosed in the natural and the human sciences, but insists that these are

only aspects or dimensions of reality. Respect for the being of things, *a fortiori* for the being of persons, makes the scientist more than a scientist, it makes him a metaphysician. ‘That is only another way of saying’, Farrer rather nicely adds, ‘that as well as being a scientist, he is a man; and, indeed, most scientists are human beings.’⁶ The metaphysician - and the theologian is, of course, a metaphysician - does not ignore science, but his prime interest is humane philosophy. Already, in *Finite and Infinite*, Farrer had observed that what makes the typical metaphysician is a balance of scientific and moral passion. (He added a highly pertinent footnote about Kant in this connection: ‘If in Kant the two were liable to come unstuck, that is an index of his ill-success.’⁷)

The limits of scientific knowledge, therefore, are transcended in personal knowledge and in moral knowledge. In a broadcast review of Gabriel Marcel’s Gifford Lectures (*The Mystery of Being*), reprinted in *Reflective Faith*,⁸ Farrer again contrasts scientific truth, experimentally verified and conformable to laws, with moral and personal truth, which requires deep penetration into the very being of a particular individual person and of particular persons in relation. Such personal knowledge comes first and foremost through personal interaction. But the same is true of decision and choice. In *The Freedom of the Will*, Farrer points out how a scientific account of a decision, reducing it to factors and causality, as he puts it, is not an account of a decision at all, but only of events in which the decision took shape.⁹

A fortiori, God’s action transcends both the natural and the human worlds. As Farrer says in his introduction to Leibniz’s *Theodicy*, again reprinted in *Reflective Faith*, ‘God’s action cannot be a factor among factors; the Creator works through and in all creaturely action’. We can never say ‘this is the creature and that is God’ of distinguishable causalities in the natural world.¹⁰ Divine transcendence, therefore, is not just a higher degree of transcendence than human personal and moral transcendence. It is a different kind of transcendence altogether. For the human person remains a part of nature and a product of nature even when, in the spheres of morality, personal existence, and interpersonal relation, we transcend the world of nature as studied in the sciences. God’s transcendence is in no way part or product of nature. On the contrary, the world of nature and the human world that has emerged from it are products of God’s agency and the sphere of God’s action from a wholly other dimension. Nevertheless it is human will and human agency that supply the primary analogies for our talk of God’s will and God’s agency.

Later in this paper I shall be turning to the question of the manner in which God’s providential action takes place in and through creaturely energies and agencies. But my primary concern now is to stay at the creaturely level and examine not so much the moral and personal transcendence of human persons,

but rather the way in which, notwithstanding that transcendence, human persons are rooted and grounded in the natural world explored by science, and, moreover, necessarily so. Indeed my main purpose is to defend and explore that necessity. Here I shall be developing the idea, crucial to Farrer's theodicy, that finite persons are necessarily fashioned in and through an evolving material world.

Our Rootedness in Nature and an Evolving Material World

But, first, let me dwell, for a moment, not so much on the necessity as on the fact of our rootedness in nature. That human beings are embedded in the natural world and are products of biological evolution goes without saying. We are a highly developed animal species. Our higher powers of thought and action are inextricably bound up with our physicality and our senses. Consciousness begins with sense; and personal life, as Farrer puts it, is incarnate in the reactors of the brain.¹¹ In his Gifford Lectures, *The Freedom of the Will*, he spells out the way in which the mind organises patterns of behaviour and action at lower levels – the latter being instrumental to the efficacy of the former.¹² In his book, *Saving Belief*, he dwells on the complexity of these levels – atomic, molecular, cellular, vegetable, animal, social – and on the amazing way in which God makes the higher forms make themselves in and through their interaction. 'Science studies the pattern', he says, 'but theology assigns the cause'.¹³ He emphasises the point, to be developed in much greater detail in *A Science of God?*, as we shall see, that it takes the whole story of evolution to make any one of us. 'Were we not remarking', he observes, 'that if God wished to make no more than any single one of us, he would need to make half a universe? And why? Because no one of us would be the creature he is, if a thousand thousand lines of converging history, both physical and personal, had not met in him. Your life or mine is but a half-sentence in the book of the world. Tear it from its place, and it cannot be read; or if it can be read, it signifies nothing.'¹⁴ The 'need to make half a universe' is, of course, a typical instance of Farrer's rhetoric. In fact, what he had said earlier on was 'For you to be what you are involves a universe.'¹⁵

Already, this factual rootedness of the higher forms of personal life in the action and being of lower forms involves a kind of necessity. If God wished to make any one of us, he would *need* to make half a universe. This goes both for the long evolutionary and historical narrative that lies behind each person's formation, and for the organisational hierarchy of levels just mentioned. The very nature of our personal sensitivities and of our rational and creative capacities and potentialities is bound up with the underlying structures that they

organise and utilise. In a word, both the history and the structure are internal to the values of personal life that they make possible and that they embody. We shall return to the implications of all this for theodicy in a moment.

This kind of necessity, reflecting factual conditions internal to the realities and values that are made possible by them and that supervene upon them, is precisely the kind of necessity explored and defended by Saul Kripke.¹⁶ In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke, by distinguishing necessity from analyticity, is able to show convincingly that certain properties are essential to objects and states of affairs being what they are – objects and states of affairs that, in themselves, are wholly empirical. I think Farrer and Kripke would have been in agreement about this kind of essentialism. It is far from necessary that there should be human beings. But human beings, if there are to be such, are necessarily formed in and through evolution, history, and particular life stories of nurture and growth.

One implication of this kind of essentialism is that Bertrand Russell's remark, in *The Analysis of Mind*, that 'there is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past'¹⁷ cannot possibly be accepted. For 'human beings' posited in being five minutes ago with built-in 'memory' traces would not be human beings. The suggestion is logically incoherent, if we take logic to include factual necessities as well as analytic ones. The point being made by both Farrer and Kripke is that a real history of formation and growth, and a real history of interpersonal relation are internal to what it is to be a human being.

Similar considerations reinforce our rejection of the notion of middle knowledge (*scientia media*) as a possible divine attribute. I do not discuss here the question of God's alleged knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, except to repeat that the tenability of that notion depends on the coherence of compatibilism. Farrer convincingly refuted that idea in *The Freedom of the Will*. But middle knowledge requires not only a compatibilist account of freewill and determinism; it requires also the coherence of the idea that God could just actualise a world containing only those free creatures who, God knew, would act well - God's middle knowledge enabling him to make that selection. But a world of particular persons cannot possibly be actualised just like that, even by omnipotence. If some such rootedness in nature and some such history of formation and growth in and through relations with others as we find, factually, to be the case, are essential to our being the persons we are, then it is incoherent to suggest that fully formed individuals could just be actualised – or indeed that a specific process of formation leading to just this or that individual could just be actualised. The point is similar to the point made against Russell. For us to be

the persons we are, there has to have been an open, evolving, universe, a complex history of the formation of cultures and societies, and actual life histories of free persons in relation.

Before I return to the implications of all this for theodicy, let me add a word or two about the other side of Farrer's treatment of what it is to be a person. I have been stressing our rootedness in nature, but what have been drawn out of nature are spiritual beings, persons made in the image of God. As Farrer puts it in *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, man shares the good and evil of animal – physical – nature. But 'he is a talking beast, and in his speech lies his reason. Through reason he shares, however faintly, that truth which is the mind of God, and becomes a copy or reflection of the divine likeness, in short, a person'.¹⁸ And, in *A Science of God?*, he writes, 'The most godlike thing God creates is a person'.¹⁹ Farrer points out again that sub-human nature, including our own, already has a plus – a creative pull or persuasion leading to higher forms. In persons the plus is much greater: they can enter into the creative thoughts of God and further his purposes by doing his will. Man reveals God in serving as a sketch and as a pencil, Farrer concludes. Made in God's image, he becomes God's instrument.²⁰

Implications of our Rootedness in Nature for Farrer's Theodicy

Let us now turn back to the implications of our necessary rootedness in nature for theodicy. The fact that human life and all the values of human life are inextricably rooted in nature and bound up with all the law-governed dimensions of nature and society that science researches enables Farrer to sketch the first stages of a viable theodicy. He does this not only in respect of the free will defence, but also in respect of natural evil – the side of the theodicy problem on which Farrer concentrates in *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*. It is the same law-governed energies and forces that make us and all the sensitivities and values of our human being possible that also render us vulnerable to clashes and accidents and deprivations of often horrendous kinds. As with all animals, our own exposure to disastrous accident is a function of our physicality.

It follows from this that accidents and disasters cannot be thought of as having been planned, arranged, or sent by the Creator. Let me quote Farrer at some length here, since the point is of some significance in countering popular misconceptions about creation and providence:

It was for the best... that God made a half chaos of self-moving, brainless forces to be the bottom and soil of his creation, out of which higher forms could arise. But then a semi-chaos, if it is to be itself, must be a field of limitless accident; and accident is by definition an uncalculated effect. It may

be foreseen, provided against, discounted, or profited by; it cannot be intended or arranged. It would be meaningless to say that God himself planned the detail of a chaos, or of a semi-chaos either, in its chaotic aspect. His infinite contrivance draws some good out of every cross-accident... But he has not calculated the accident with a view to the resultant good. If he had, it would not be an accident, it would only seem to be one.²¹

The apparent austerity of this aspect of Farrer's theodicy is mitigated by two factors, first by the factor just mentioned, namely, God's ability to bring good out of evil in innumerable ways, and, secondly – and this is really the supreme instance of the first point – God's promise of eternal life for his finite personal creatures thus arduously fashioned here below. Farrer was quite clear that the costs of our formation in and though the physical universe would be unacceptably high if we could not hold to Christian conviction of a perfected consummation of all things in the ultimate future, a consummation in which life's personal, human, victims, will all share.

I wish to concentrate for a moment on one aspect of our rootedness in physicality that raises very acute problems for theodicy, namely, the death of infants and the fate of imbeciles. Farrer devoted a short and highly controversial appendix in *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* to this problem, under the title 'Imperfect Lives'²². He suggests there that it is a function of our animality that some human births just fail to reach the stature of humanity, the stature, that is, of being a rational person (or a speaking and loving person, as he also puts it). With such cases there is not yet, and with total imbeciles there is never, a creature capable of being immortalised by our Creator and Redeemer. Farrer is sure that God 'loves and saves whatever is there to be saved or loved' and that 'if there ever was a speaking and loving person, there is a creature for God to immortalize'. 'But if the reasoning person never developed, what are we to think? The baby smiled before it died. Will God bestow immortality on a smile?'²³

Farrer's many critics over this appendix were probably unaware that the Farrers themselves had experience of handicap in their own family. But, of course, handicap is something very different from infant death or total imbecility. We may still wonder about Farrer's emphasis on language and reason as necessary conditions of a fully human stature. But the issue of when personhood begins is a very acute one, not least in respect of the ethics of abortion. Farrer himself writes, 'Shall we say that every human birth, however imperfect, is the germ of a personality, and God will give it an eternal future? We shall still have to ask why the fact of being born should be allowed a decisive importance; we shall wonder what to think of children dying in the womb, or suffering abortion; and we shall be at a loss where to draw the line.

Not that it will be any easier to draw it', he goes on, 'if we equate the origin of an immortal soul with the attainment of speech or reason. For we shall still have to ask, What degree of reason? Rationality comes by stages in those who acquire it, and not all imbeciles are totally mindless.'²⁴

This is indeed a problem, and one could imagine Farrer's arguments being called upon to justify not only abortion but also infanticide. Peter Singer, for example, now attempts to justify infanticide, not for Nazi-like eugenic reasons, of course, but on utilitarian grounds for putting the most severely damaged out of their misery, as we do with animals.²⁵ Farrer himself would certainly not have approved of that. Of such cases, he writes, 'Out of natural piety, and a respect for the divine image in man, we treat them as human. We do not kill our imbeciles; we baptise dying infants, and give them Christian burial.'²⁶ But, all the same, it is clear that he did not think that they were really already immortalisable persons.

These considerations do have a bearing on the ethics of abortion. It seems wise, indeed imperative, to draw the undrawable line at viability, and, just because of scientific progress, to reduce the legal age for permissible abortions, permissible for genuinely medical reasons. And the use of embryos up to fourteen days for IVF or medical research does seem defensible, ethically speaking. For we cannot seriously suppose that these embryos are already immortal souls destined for heaven, any more than are the millions of fertilised eggs that do not implant and are naturally washed away. Fourteen days is, admittedly, a somewhat arbitrary figure. But, as Peter Geach once argued, if you want to build a house and are unsure where the firm ground ends and the marshy ground begins, you build the house well back of the uncertain terrain.

I now come to the most central and important theodicy question. Granted that specifically human life is essentially bound up with its physical roots, both in terms of its evolutionary background and in terms of its many-levelled structure, did the creation of finite personal life have to be like this? Is there a deeper necessity for some such grounding, some such formation from below, some such drawing of God's personal creatures out of nature into spirit?

Farrer, at times, shows considerable diffidence over the supposition that we can answer this deeper question why. In *Saving Belief* he writes, 'If it be asked why a Providence which mends the world did not make it such as to need no mending, we answer that the question conceals and involves another question, Why God made this world rather than some other; and this second question is one which we neither need ask nor indeed are able to ask.'²⁷ On the other hand, a little earlier in the same book Farrer rejects categorically the notion that we can imagine a world of persons fashioned some other way than by rooting them in, and drawing them out of, a physical universe of law-

governed energies and forces that can and do at the same time cause so much harm. 'You suggest that God might have made some such higher forms as he has made without rooting them in the action and being of lower forms', he writes, 'I reply that we have no power to conceive anything of the kind'.²⁸ And in *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* he not only toys with, but actually endorses, the idea that some such rooting is necessary.

Let us examine the way in which Farrer does this in his theodicy book. In the chapter on 'Physical Accident',²⁹ with many caveats about our ability to answer the question why God has made the world as he has made it, he nevertheless goes on to sketch two highly anthropomorphic parables which do propose at least an indirect answer to this question. The first we may dub an Augustinian parable, namely the parable of the gardener who chooses to plant inferior beds when the superior are full. Thus God may be thought of as deciding 'to invent a further and lower level of creatures when each higher level is complete.'³⁰ Now we must be quite clear that Farrer explicitly rejects this parable. Unlike the gardener's limited field of activity, infinite inventiveness cannot be thought bound to move to a lower level, when any kind is exhausted. 'What logical reason is there' Farrer asks, 'against an indefinitely great number <of kinds>, all different, and all of equal nobility?'³¹

Having rejected the Augustinian parable, Farrer tries a different approach, sketching what, with John Hick, we may dub an Irenaean parable, indicating why the Creator has to begin from below. In order to have finite personal creatures, with a being and nature of their own, the Creator has to place a kind of screen between his infinite glory and their creaturely selves. The material, evolving, universe is just such a screen, begun with the most elementary organisation of energy, and gradually built up, level by level, till rational personal beings emerge, thoroughly rooted and grounded in what is fundamentally other than God.³²

Farrer ends this chapter with a return to diffidence about our ability to handle such deeper questions why. All the same, there is no doubt about his preference for the second, Irenaean, parable, even if he allows an element of the Augustinian parable to stand, namely, its insistence on the value of each level of creation in itself. But the Irenaean picture predominates, as we see in the short summary passage in *A Science of God?*, at the end of the chapter on 'The God of Nature', although, characteristically, the supposition of necessity is qualified by a return to diffident agnosticism. Here is the passage in full:

If I am challenged to say in one sentence why there are what men call natural disasters, I shall say this: it is because God makes the world make itself; or rather, since the world is not a single being, he makes the multitude of created forces make the world, in the process of making or

being themselves. It is this principle of divine action that gives the world such endless vitality, such vital variety in every part. The price of it is, that the agents God employs in the basic levels of the structure will do what they will do, whether human convenience is served by it or not. Yet the creative persuasion has brought it about that there is a world, not a chaos, and that in this world there are men. Would it have been possible for God to have made a world without a free-for-all of elemental forces at the bottom of it? I suppose not, but I do not know; and there is (I take it) only one Mind that does.’³³

John Hick, in the first edition of his big book on the problem of evil, *Evil and the God of Love*, has a short section on Farrer’s *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, in which he praises it as ‘one of the best recent books on the problem of evil – perhaps the best’³⁴. But he characterises Farrer’s theodicy as representing ‘a basically Augustinian approach.’ He cites Farrer’s two parables and indeed stresses the Irenaean character of the second, which, of course, chimes in with Hick’s own Irenaean approach; but he then alleges that Farrer repudiates both parables equally in favour of a reverent agnosticism. This does scant justice to Farrer’s clear preference for the Irenaean parable, notwithstanding his repeated diffidence about pressing such why questions, and it is a great pity that, in the second edition of *Evil and the God of Love*, Hick simply omitted the section on Farrer.

Let us stay, then, with the Irenaean parable and consider the idea that rooting and grounding God’s personal creatures in a physical, evolving, universe and letting the human world make itself precisely in and through the processes of evolution and history are necessary conditions of the formation of any finite persons, with their own God-given being and nature, before ever they can be drawn into relation with their Maker and eventually immortalised. This idea constitutes an extension of the earlier suggestion that the values of specifically human life are inextricably bound up with the whole history of the universe that both makes them possible and also forms the background and conditions of particular life stories. It is now being suggested that some such process of formation is internal to the very being and nature of any finite personal life over against the Creator – internal, at any rate, as far as the establishment and formation of finite persons are concerned. (I say ‘some such process of formation’, since it is unlikely that the actual evolving universe is the only one capable of coming up with the conditions of life and personhood.) If it were indeed the case that creaturely persons could only be formed in some such way, then this would provide us with a very powerful theodicy indeed. For natural evil as well as moral evil could then be seen as inevitable by-products of any

system necessary, not just for *our* formation, but for the formation of creaturely persons as such.

God's Providence in bringing Evolution to a climax in the Formation of Persons

I now return to the subject of divine providence, one of the main themes in Farrer's later writings. I concentrate here on what Farrer says in *A Science of God?* about God's providence in bringing cosmic and biological evolution to a climax in the formation of persons. This illustrates Farrer's understanding of double agency. What Farrer means by this phrase is the way in which divine creative and providential agency works in and through the energies and agencies of creatures. Double agency is certainly not confined, on Farrer's view, to the sphere of 'God's interaction with agents and not with the whole of creation', as John Polkinghorne asserts.³⁵ Certainly the grace/freewill relation is the paradigm of double agency for Farrer; but it is the paradigm case of a relation which obtains at every level and at every phase of the creative process, not least in respect of evolution, as Farrer's treatment of that topic in *A Science of God?* and in the chapter on 'Providence and Evil' in *Saving Belief* makes clear. In no way does Farrer disparage evolutionary theory. Evolution is, for him, a supremely reasonable supposition. Gradual emergence is far more plausible than miraculous insertion. Evolution – cosmic and biological – is God's way of making the creature make itself, for very good reasons, as we have seen. But it does not follow that evolutionary theory can tell the whole story, when you consider the highest forms of life – Farrer mentions Shakespeare in this connection – that have developed from elementary systems of physical energy. When you consider all this, he observes, 'the case for a creative pull of some kind, drawing nature upwards, is a case that cannot be lightly dismissed'.³⁶ We cannot just assume that the evolution of higher forms is nothing but a natural process working itself out. What does it mean to say that the mind of Shakespeare is implicitly contained in the interactions of inanimate substance? Clearly the fundamental energies of the universe have it in them to evolve the highest forms – but by themselves and inevitably? Much more plausible is it to suppose a hidden guidance or persuasion that makes creatures make themselves and more. Farrer uses the language of persuasion in his summary treatment of this issue in *Saving Belief*. I have already quoted his observation that 'Science studies the pattern, but theology assigns the cause'. But this is how he goes on to gloss that phrase 'the cause': 'that imperceptible persuasion exercised by creative Will on the chaos of natural forces, setting a bias on the positive and achieving the creatures'.³⁷ And, returning to *A Science of God?*, we find Farrer

claiming: God ‘thinks all processes at every level into being themselves and into being themselves true to type. And yet without faking the story or defying probability at any point he pulls the history together into the patterns we observe’. The result, looking back from which we discern the hidden hand of God, includes, of course, not only the evolution of life and the moral and personal transcendence of which I spoke at the beginning of this paper, not only the creative heights typified by Shakespeare, but also salvation history and the Incarnation.

Here are two more summary quotations from *A Science of God?*: ‘How are we to swallow the world’s achievements of pattern, as results due to no influence and proceeding from no cause?’ In fact, ‘the pattern is scattered piecemeal over the forces and events which make up the world; it is drawn together and enjoyed as one in the mind of God’.³⁸

This positing of hidden divine guidance or persuasion extending in and through the whole story of cosmic and biological evolution, as well as of human history and the life stories of individual agents, has a bearing on the question whether intelligent life on Earth is unique. As I have written elsewhere,

In itself the notion of extraterrestrial intelligent life is perfectly coherent. The basic stuff and energies of the universe unquestionably have it in them to combine and develop...in such a way as to form the conditions for such life and to produce such life, as they manifestly have done on this planet. And the vast number of galaxies similar to ours makes it highly likely that these conditions have been realized elsewhere and that other forms of intelligent life have evolved. This argument, however, is a purely statistical, probabilistic, argument, which presupposes that all the factors relevant to the evolution of intelligent life are known and are evenly distributed across the cosmos. But it may be the case that, while the stuff of the universe certainly has it in it to evolve intelligent life, it is highly unlikely actually to do so without some providential direction. The many extraordinary coincidences, from those factors in the early stages of cosmic evolution that have given rise to talk of an anthropic principle, through the many factors that have to coincide for there to be a stable, life-supporting environment, to the many factors that have to coincide if the higher organisms are to appear, may only be accountable for in terms of divine providence, and may well have only been realized once...³⁹

These reflections, Farrer’s and my own, also have a bearing on the ugly clash between evolutionary theory and creationism, especially in American schools. Clearly, Farrer would have no truck with doctrinaire rejection of evolutionary theory. Quite apart from the evidence in its favour, expounded persuasively by such writers as Richard Dawkins, evolutionary theory plays a crucial role in Farrer’s own theodicy, as we have seen. But Farrer’s work shows

how acceptance of evolutionary theory in no way rules out a teleological view of nature. This can be seen at two stages in the picture Farrer builds up. In the first place, while evolutionary theory traces – maybe with some gaps still – the mechanisms and the processes whereby new life forms appear and develop, *given* the fundamental properties, powers and propensities of nature, and *given* the laws under which the basic energies operate, it has no explanation whatsoever for those properties, powers, propensities and laws being what they are. And in the second place, it fails to account for the highest forms of mind, personhood, morality and creativity, that is, for the ways in which the natural world eventually comes to transcend its natural origin and basis. As many writers and thinkers have shown, there is no insuperable contradiction between the theory of evolution and the doctrine of Creation. Indeed the latter makes most sense of the former.

Notes

- 1 *Interpretation and Belief*, p.3.
- 2 *The Glass of Vision*, p.65.
- 3 *A Science of God?*, p.21.
- 4 *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, pp.97f.
- 5 *A Science of God?*, p.29.
- 6 *The Glass of Vision*, p.66.
- 7 *Finite and Infinite*, p.87.
- 8 Austin Farrer, 'Freedom and Theology', in *Reflective Faith*, pp.163-170.
- 9 *The Freedom of the Will*, p.138.
- 10 *Reflective Faith*, p.108.
- 11 *The Freedom of the Will*, p.92.
- 12 *ibid.*, ch. III.
- 13 *Saving Belief*, p.51.
- 14 *ibid.*, p.70.
- 15 *ibid.*, p.54.
- 16 Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell 1980. I am grateful to Douglas Hedley for reminding me of Kripke's argument.
- 17 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, London: George Allen & Unwin 1921, p.159.
- 18 *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, pp.106f.
- 19 *A Science of God?*, p.101.
- 20 *ibid.*, p.123.
- 21 *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, 164.
- 22 *ibid.*, pp.189-191.
- 23 *ibid.*, .190.
- 24 *loc. cit.*
- 25 See, e.g., Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition 1993, ch. 2.

- 26 *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, p.189.
- 27 *Saving Belief*, p.58.
- 28 *ibid.*, p.52.
- 29 *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited*, ch. IV.
- 30 *ibid.*, p.66.
- 31 *ibid.*, p.68.
- 32 *ibid.*, pp.68-73.
- 33 *A Science of God?*, pp.90f.
- 34 John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, London: Macmillan 1966, pp.273-276.
- 35 John Polkinghorne, *Science and Providence*, London: SPCK 1989, 12.
- 36 *A Science of God?*, p.45.
- 37 *Saving Belief*, p.51.
- 38 *A Science of God?*, p.81.
- 39 Brian Hebblethwaite, 'The Impossibility of Multiple Incarnations', *Theology* civ (2001), p.331.
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